CityCoins DAO Structure - Proposal v2

Context, see the forum thread on Proposal v1.

I have updated the DAO proposal to favor a delegated model of governance. Given the feedback from last week, I think there are several advantages to a liquid or representative form democracy that this proposal seeks to accomplish. For simplicity purposes, I’ve included the revised portions below.

Overview:
The goal of a CityCoins DAO is to empower city residents and give token holders a voice in how the city’s treasury is managed. The CityCoins DAO will seek to establish representative democracy through a token model, whereby token holders delegate their votes to a community panel, responsible for stewarding their City’s protocol.

The summary of this structure includes the following entities / stakeholders:

CityCoins Governance Association

  • The CityCoins Governance Association will be set up as a public charity to build and support civic technology for the public good. It will be responsible for the long-term governance of the CityCoins protocol.
  • The Governance Association will have the following responsibilities and may delegate to subDAOs/workstreams:
    • Coordinate best practices and initiatives across cities
    • Support existing CityCoins on exchange listings and liquidity
    • Support individual CityDAOs with compliance and operations (ie. legal, accounting, set-up, onboarding)
  • The Governance Association will appoint director(s) to manage the day-to-day operations of the foundation and one supervisor to ensure directors are doing their job in accordance with the relevant laws.

City DAOs

  • City DAOs will be managed by token holders, who delegate their vote to the Community Advisory Panel (CAP).
    • The primary responsibilities of the CAP is to:
      • Allocate funding for workstreams that advance the DAO’s mission.
      • Implement a capital allocation strategy that does not deplete the treasury.
      • Take reasonable measures to increase resident adoption.
    • Each city will have its own CAP, comprised of a 5-10 person committee responsible for stewardship of the City DAO.
    • A majority of the CAP members should be local to the city. CAP members will be KYC’d by the CityCoins Foundation to provide proof of residency.
    • The term for each CAP period shall be 1 calendar year. There are no term limits to serve on a CAP.
    • DAO proposals are subject to veto oversight from the Foundation to ensure it is operating in line with its charter.
  • Who are CAP Members?
    • CAP members are active communities members who have demonstrated alignment with the CityCoins mission, and have shown a willingness to take a leadership role in the ecosystem.
    • Any local community members are eligible to nominate themselves to serve on the Council, but it is up to their fellow community members to determine to whom they delegate their voting power.
  • Workstream Examples (illustrative purposes only) :
    • Community - initiatives to increase engagement and awareness in local cities. Community working groups are expected to implement initiatives such as: meet ups and events, hackathons and educational programs.
    • Ecosystem - proposals related to supporting builders and partnerships. This may include infrastructure, work on CityApps or other proposals related to furthering the CityCoins ecosystem.
    • Public Goods - proposals related to supporting public goods in the city. Examples include parks and public spaces, climate and environmental initiatives, etc.
    • DAO Ops - focused on legal and compliance, accounting, and operations across cities.

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A couple key questions I noted down from today’s call:
1. How many panel members should be included in the CAP? 5-10 feels good to me but I’m keen to hear if anyone has a rationale for more or less.
2. How long should panel members hold their voting position for? Personally I like the idea of being able to delegate and revoke your vote to a CAP member at anytime with a slight delay to ensure people don’t game the system at critical times.

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Amazing job. I like that a lot of this is rooted in how successful projects like Gitcoin and ENS have structured.

I think maximizing the effective deployment of capital is just so insanely important for the success of this project. In fact it may be the single most important thing.

Just a random thought at this point, but in terms of maximizing leverage of every Stack spent, my feeling is deploying it as grants (say $5-25k) into crypto projects that consume MiamiCoin, new fungibles, and nonfungibles could be the highest leverage thing. Basically focus on the builders, as Ryan Shea recommended.

The reason being is that these builders create demand for the CityCoins, create new markets with their own tokens and NFTs, new content / media, new community naturally as a function of their work. They also are incentivized to work harder (more efficiently on a dollar cost basis) on their own projects.

Maybe this goes without saying.

But I could imagine 50-75% of the funds being marked toward builders (maybe call it “the intersection of crypto and Miami”), and 25% toward philanthropy (soup kitchens etc). With the idea that we can do more good if we grow the ecosystem by empowering builders rather than give the ecosystem away without expecting growth and ending up in a terminal state.

Super excited about all this, fantastic work!

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Derek some thoughts on your questions:

  1. panel being less than 5 may be too small from a “putting enough brainpower together to reach a great outcome” standpoint. More than 10 could bring in poor quality panelists and people may not even know who’s being voted in.

  2. think something like that could make sense. Maybe the delay is synchronized toward the end of the calendar year though so the governance association doesn’t have to KYC people at all times of the year. Rather than people being added and removed with just a two week buffer.

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  1. 10 on the CAP panel. Reduces potential risk of corruption in grant proposals. Same with CCGA. KYC is necessary for good governance. I think CCGA members are to have annual disclosures/review are necessary to maintain public confidence and trust.

  2. Agree with Derek that anytime, but have a lock period. This eliminates potential issues with a panel member acting in bad faith to the mission.

  3. Agree with Patrick that leverage is preferable to developers of the ecosystem. Idea grants and Proposals that come from developers are worthy recipients because they are inclusive and sometimes focus on youth education.

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Earlier today I mentioned an open vote model for removing board members. In this model, verified citycoin token holders will be able to down-vote underperforming board members at any time instead of relying on set election cycles. Theoretically, this will ensure the board members are continuously performing their duties well and not just tailoring when it’s nearing time for an election term, etc. Here are some thoughts on how it might be able to work:

If a simple majority of actively participating token holders down vote a board member (how to reasonably calculate active membership participation is still in the works, I made a suggestion at the end of this comment), it will trigger an event in which the board member at hand will have say 2 weeks to schedule and set a trail meeting/assembly. This assembly will act as a forum to determine why or why not the board member should stay. The board member in question will be able to state their case, and active token holders from the affirming and opposing side can further deliberate, stating their positions on why or why not the board member should maintain their position (perhaps George’s product can also assist with aggregating data to inform various KPIs and act as a sort of results oracle?). After the discussion, an active majority vote will determine finally whether they stay on the board or not.

If the deliberation trail meeting isn’t scheduled within the specified time frame by the board member in question, they automatically are removed. Perhaps they can be replaced with a new board member directly appointed by the rest of the existing board, or an election can be held to replace the board member during the next proposal voting cycle?

As for defining the active participation number which will inform the threshold for triggering the trail assembly. I am thinking a batch of proof of participation tokens can be minted and distributed to verified citycoin token holders after each assembly, working group event, etc. During each yet to be defined epoch, the number of unique wallet addresses holding these proof of participation tokens are calculated and an estimated active member number is determined.

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